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Remarks by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen At The 61ST Munich Security Conference (MSC) Main Panel Discussion on “Making Waves: Maritime Tensions In the Indo-Pacific” on 15 Feb 2025
Speeches | 16 Feb 2025 07:00 (GMT+8)

 

  1.             Congratulations on convening the 61st edition of the MSC.

     

  2.             It is my pleasure to be speaking alongside Mr Enrique Manalo and Dr Fu Ying once again. At the 59th MSC, we exchanged views on “Bridging Troubled Waters” at the Maritime Security Roundtable.

     

  3.            First, let’s look at the numbers in the SCS and Taiwan Strait to see how contestation is shaping up there.

     

    1.            The China Coast Guard (CCG) patrols around disputed territories in the SCS. In 2024, 1,939 ship days of CCG patrols were observed, increasing 17% since 2023.

       

    2.            There is also the Chinese maritime militia. In 2023, an average of 195 Chinese militia vessels were seen around disputed features in the SCS on any given day, a 35% increase from 2022.

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    3.            For the US, since 2011, the US has negotiated access to 12 new defence sites in the Philippines and Australia, constructed new installations in Japan and Guam, and expanded facilities at dozens of other installations across the region.

       

    4.            The US has about 140,000 military troops in Guam, Hawaii, Japan and the ROK, spread out around 29 military bases.

       

    5.            Last December, the US deployed three aircraft carriers to the Asia-Pacific, ahead of the inauguration of President Donald Trump.

       

    6.            Europe has also stepped up its maritime activities and engagement of the region. Italy and France deployed aircraft carriers to the region in 2024, while the UK will do so this year.

       

    7.            Two German ships called into ports in the Philippines and Malaysia in Oct 2024, in Germany’s first naval engagement with these countries in over two decades.

       

  4.            What are the strategic goals of these players?

     

    1.            The US aims to maintain its dominance as a Pacific power – a position it has held since battling the Japanese in World War II, and has retained after the war to ensure a maritime bulwark against the spread of Communism.

       

      1.            The US seeks to achieve this by working with its allies, particularly those in the Asia-Pacific, such as Japan, Korea, and Australia.

         

    2.            European powers, including the UK, have significant economic interests in the Asia-Pacific.

       

      1.            The SCS alone sees an estimated 40 percent of EU foreign trade passing through.

         

      2.            Beyond economic interest, European powers are keen to signal to the US that they are reliable allies, including in the Asia-Pacific.

         

    3.             China’s strategic intent is two-fold.

       

      1.            First, China’s actions in the SCS are a response to the US containment strategy, encompassed in the island chain concept. This originated from the US’ campaign to contain Japanese expansion in World War II.

         

      2.            Second, China’s presence in the SCS can be seen as its own rendering of the Monroe Doctrine.

         

      3.            China is not yet capable of enforcing a Monroe doctrine in the SCS, but the aspiration is the same. In 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that “Matters in Asia ultimately must be resolved by Asians, and Asia’s security ultimately must be protected by Asians”. I think that remains China’s view.  

         

  5.            Now, China is saddled with two conflicting goals – while it needs to show strength and power to the US and its allies, China also needs to manage relations with its smaller neighbours in ASEAN.

     

    1.           On military strength, China has made dramatic strides.

       

      1.            China now has the world’s largest maritime fighting force, operating 234 warships to the US’ 219.

         

      2.            China’s first home-grown aircraft carrier, Fujian, is expected to be operationally ready this year. In Oct 2024, China also conducted “dual-carrier” manoeuvres at sea for the first time with its two operational carriers, Liaoning and Shandong.

         

    2.            But this dichotomy has affected its relations with proximate neighbours, other claimant states.

       

      1.            Negotiations on the SCS Code of Conduct (COC) have been protracted. In 2018, then-Chinese Premier Li Keqiang had said that China aimed to conclude the COC within three years.

         

      2.            As it stands, we are no closer to a solution for the disputes in SCS since ASEAN and China signed the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” (DOC) in 2002.

         

      3.            Tit-for-tat between China and other claimant states on the ground, especially the Philippines, has impeded progress.
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