Introduction

Let me on behalf of Senior Minister Teo Chee Hean, Senior Minister of State Heng Chee How and Senior Minister of State Zaqy Mohamad, welcome all of you attending this 21st edition of the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD). With your strong and consistent support each year, the SLD has grown, and now receives more than 40 Ministerial-level representatives, and some 570 delegates from more than 40 countries present today.

The 21st, as is customary, is when you become of adult age. So has the SLD at 21 shown promise as an adult? I think so. I think it has matured. I think it has broadened. I think it is a bit more realistic, less idealistic, but more practical. And if it is any success, it is because of your presence and your willingness to come here and engage – and sometimes do verbal combat, and other times just to listen.

I want to thank the board and the members of IISS for starting this quest. 21 years ago, the idea of a security conference in Asia were started on a wing and a prayer, and a hope that dialogue was useful for the defence security arena.

Avoiding War in Asia

My main message over the past few years has been consistent, and this year will be no different – we must avoid a physical conflict in Asia. Because we can all agree, that neither Asia nor the World can withstand a third geopolitical shock.

The war in Ukraine is now into its third year following Russia's invasion. NATO countries showed great determination in this year's Munich Security Conference to support Ukraine to defend her sovereignty, and to do more, fully cognisant of the implications of the upcoming US Presidential Elections. Nevertheless, as the conflict drags out, so too the certainty of continuing support and achievable outcomes. Meanwhile in the Middle East, what began as a terrorist attack by Hamas on Israeli communities now threatens to draw in other powers to pose a wider contagion.

If there is any salient epiphany against this backdrop, it must be "not here, in Asia". Indeed, this was the cri de Coeur when President Zelensky spoke to us two years ago here at the Shangri-La Dialogue. I will never forget that. It is still vividly etched in my mental imagery – we were just coming out of COVID. I remember seeing President Zelensky, and we did not know where he was – we knew he was under threat, and his country was under threat. He spoke to us, and he said we must take the "pre-emptive way, not the one that comes after the war has started, after hostilities have broken out, after we have hundreds of thousands of casualties and even millions of casualties". And I am glad that he is here today to be able to add to that and I am sure that all of us are looking forward and honoured by his presence later on. But what ought, and can we do? What agency should be brought to bear? And that is the imaginative title of this session, "Reimagining Solutions". But truth be told, I had some problem trying to live up to this. As you know, I am, by training, a surgeon. When I cut open bodies, I see the same parts each and every time. And I put it to you that when you find a surgeon, you are not necessarily looking for the most imaginative one. So I am afraid I am going to disappoint in terms of what we ought to do. It is going to be hard work and humdrum.

Most of us here would agree that the US and China are dominant protagonists to decide Asia's fate for this decade and beyond. What their leaders say count a great deal. Thankfully, both have disavowed physical conflict between their two countries. US President Joe Biden has said that the US seeks to "responsibly manage the competition between [them] so it does not tip into conflict". Secretary Austin said the same thing, "we seek competition, not confrontation, and war with China is neither imminent nor unavoidable" – very reassuring words. China President Xi Jinping has stated that China "has no intention to challenge the US or to unseat it", and "[we] will not fight a cold war or a hot war with anyone".

Despite these reassuring affirmations, temperatures did go up when President Biden said that it was up to Taiwan to "make up their mind" on independence, and when asked, affirmed that the US would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. So too, did temperatures go up when President Xi said that the "East is rising while the West is declining" and that China would not give up "even one inch" of territory in the South China Sea and would resolve the Taiwan question.

The meeting between the two leaders in San Francisco proved a positive step to calm troubled waters, if not build back relations. After that meeting, when asked about the Taiwan elections early this year, President Biden said "We [meaning the US] do not support [Taiwanese] independence". President Xi replied that while US-China relations could not "go back to the old days", it could "embrace a brighter future".

So it was a good meeting between the two. But with the upcoming US Presidential elections this year, another meeting between the two leaders is unlikely. Expectations of increasing engagement are low on both sides. Notwithstanding this political ennui, more dialogue and positive initiatives are sorely needed.

A de facto trade war has ensued between the US and China. The US has articulated its "small yard, high fence" approach to trade on grounds of national security. Over time, the yard has grown larger despite US political leaders' assertions that they do not want decoupling. However, it is unclear how these sensitive areas can be effectively ringfenced, without significant disruption to global trade.

Then, there is the question of if and how China might retaliate to this trade policy. It has already begun. China, as the producer of 60% of rare earths globally banned the export of technology to make rare earth magnets, essential for many modern electronics.

In this flux, it is important for senior officials to step up their engagements. In 2009, both sides started the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, later replaced by the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, to deal with exactly these issues – thorny trade issues. These talks were effectively suspended in 2018 and have not resumed.

I started with trade relations because trade and security are faces of the same coin of co-dependency and pre-emption. For security, there are some realities we must face.

First, Taiwan is a red line. Against the backdrop of Russia's attack on Ukraine, it is tempting but misplaced to conflate that with Taiwan and China. Taiwan is not Ukraine, and neither is China Russia. In 2020, Russia accounted for 1.9% of global exports. China, in comparison, accounted for over 14%. Ukraine is a member of the United Nations, but Taiwan is not. Many of our countries' diplomatic positions also recognise a "One China" policy.

Taiwan is a complex issue, and the status quo of no independence and no forced reunification appears to be the best compromise for all parties involved, without precipitous actions from any party.

In the South China Sea, there will also be no quick resolution on competing claims or positions. What is therefore needed are practical measures on the ground to prevent conflicts and de-escalate.

There needs to be more dialogue and physical engagements between the US military and People's Liberation Army (PLA) personnel. The last visit of a senior ranking PLA official to the US was in 2015, by then-CMC Vice Chairman GEN Fan Changlong. For the US, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Joe Dunford visited Beijing in 2017. I suggest that it would be positive for these military-to-military exchanges to resume.

On fishing, mutual agreements can prevent disputes. Learning from the 2013 incident where a Taiwan fisherman was killed by Philippine Coast Guard personnel, Taiwan and the Philippines inked an Agreement Concerning the Facilitation of Cooperation on Law Enforcement in Fisheries Matters in 2015. Taiwan and the Philippines came to an agreement in 2015 and since then, no similar incidents have taken place.

Agreements for hydrocarbons and other resources are more complex, but not impossible. Malaysia and Thailand have carved out a joint development area for the exploration and exploitation of non-living natural resources, including hydrocarbons, within their overlapping continental shelves.

To prevent physical conflicts in the increasingly contested South China Sea, protocols like the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) and Guidelines for Air Military Encounters (GAME) reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation in the maritime and air domains. But sorely missing are paramilitary and law enforcement agencies' inclusion into these frameworks, and they need to be brought into them.

We want to avoid a repeat of past incidents such as the 2001 Hainan Island incident of a collision between the US Navy's EP-3 aircraft and the PLA Navy's fighter jet, or the more recent collisions between the Chinese and the Philippine's coast guard vessels over the Second Thomas Shoal.

Some have argued that the events in Asia are but an extension of the previous Cold War, now fought out between the US and China. Despite this strategic rivalry, the US and China are both integral to the functioning of a globally connected economy, upon which all our well-being depends. In 2022, the US accounted for 25% of global GDP and China accounted for 18%, slightly larger than that of the entire EU. Last year, China was also the top trading partner of more than 120 countries, and ASEAN as a whole.

There is another stark difference – I doubt if there will be an equivalent of a "glasnost or perestroika" moment for China. The legitimacy of the Communist Party of China under President Xi is well-entrenched among Chinese citizens who have witnessed considerable progress over the past three decades of their country and their lives under his leadership.

In this region, ASEAN plays a key role by upholding itself and its partners to the ASEAN Charter. In defence, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)-Plus Experts' Working Groups (EWGs) exist to promote military-to-military cooperation for the 18 nations. To date, more than 20 large-scale exercises have been conducted, and it is noteworthy that this is the only platform where both US and China militaries participate.

The ADMM welcomed the participation of Canada, France, and the UK as observers to the EWGs last year. Germany and the EU have also applied to be observers, and Singapore strongly supports this as a positive sign of their involvement within the ADMM-Plus structure.

Conclusion

Thank you all for your support and contributions to the SLD once again. I thank also the many people who have worked tirelessly behind-the-scenes to allow us to focus on these important conversations. Staff of the Shangri-La Hotel, the Home Team – our Police and Civil Defence Force. I have received many compliments about their service, and they do it because it is their jobs, but I think there is something deeper. As is customary after each SLD has ended, I meet hotel staff who have served you with very good service, just to thank them. Some staff have been here since the inception of the SLD and when you talk to them, they have come to believe that they are part of this Shangri-La dream, this quest for peace. They feel that they are doing their part looking for regional peace, if not beyond. So thank you, and I thank you on behalf of them. I will thank them on behalf of you as well, and I thank you all and hope for all of you to have a safe journey back home. Thank you.