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A HISTORY LESSON THE FIRST BATCH DID NOT GET
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ONE
The removal of the Dutch threat to Singapore after the Anglo-Dutch Treaty in 1824 did not
absolve the Singapore administration from maintaining some sort of protection for the island
and the port itself. Security considerations in Singapore began to centre on two issues: the
general protection of the settlement from external regional threats wherever they may arise;
and the protection of the European community from native uprisings and riots.
Under Indian administration, provisions for Singapore’s external defence suffered because
of distance, the absence of any immediate threat and, most of all, the lack of funds. Despite
Singapore’s success, its free port status meant limited revenue to the administrators, whereas
the European community on the island was not in a position to take on the burden on its
own. Things did not improve when the Straits Settlements came under the Colonial Office in
London for pretty much the same reasons, but with one additional impediment: the War Office
came into the picture and there was no agreement on the concept of defences. For most of
the time, the prevailing wisdom was that Singapore was best defended by fixed fortifications
in commanding positions around Keppel Harbour, RN warships stationed in the region
and elements of a British Indian Army regiment deployed on the island. Numerous studies
commissioned by the Governor or the War Office strongly recommended one scheme or other
but proposals were squabbled over or allowed to lapse without action. From around the time
the Straits Settlements came into existence to the eve of the Great War, now called World
War I (WWI), Singapore’s external defence comprised of a British Indian Army regiment, a
battery of Royal Artillery, a squadron of Royal Engineers and a small complement of native
troops. Whatever was done, such as the construction of Fort Canning and Fort Fullerton, was
often counter-productive. For example, the cannon at either of these forts could not engage
an enemy man-o’-war in the harbour without sinking some of the hundreds of trading vessels
berthed there; in other instances, guns were supplied without the ammunition or personnel
trained to fire them; or when British troops were deployed in Singapore they were excused
from going out into the sun or the ‘unhealthy’ local environment. In one sense, however, these
problems proved academic because the threat assessments were flawed to begin with. The
only security issue that was effectively addressed was the perceived lawlessness of the Chinese
communities in Singapore and the danger the resident European community believed this
posed to itself.
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The vacillations over the defences of Singapore were, in the final analysis, rooted in the issue of
who would foot the bill (or at least the lion’s share of it): the British Government or the colony
itself. There was nothing immediate in the Singapore scenario to threaten any embarrassing
development to the British Government and the quibbling over one proposal after another
reflected bureaucratic paper shuffling. The formation of a Local Defence Committee that
actively monitored and periodically reported on the state of the defences was a positive
outcome, as was the commitment of the Volunteers, who after 1901 enrolled Asiatic members
and expanded their range of units.
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Prospects of conflict with Germany drew down RN assets